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The Open Source and Open Science movements have demonstrated the success of distributed collaborative 
experimentation and intellectual property (IP) development. While those contributing to the effort may do so 
without seeking to secure IP rights, it is clear that credit and attribution are crucial to the scholarly lifecycle 
because they underpin reputation – when IP is created it is only fair that ‘credit is given where credit is due’. We 
propose that there need to be systems in place, independent of the project, where the evidence of ‘prior art’ can 
be registered. The authors’ thesis is that simply having such a system available will ensure proper behaviour 
between collaborators and foster higher productivity. 
Repositories  such  as  EPrints  and  myExperiment,  which  focus  respectively  on  publications  and  digital 
‘research objects’ [1],  can readily use such a system – the intellectual assets stored digitally in the repository 
can  be  registered  by  their  owners.  To  achieve  this  with  the  necessary  guarantees  we  need  an  appropriate 
registration scheme and architecture. 
 
2. Current schemes 
 
A key concept in doing business is that each party declares its position in a way that is non-repudiatable 
(NR). The subsequent action by the counterparty is constrained if it knows that NR techniques are in use. Proper 
behaviour is induced because of the implicit threat of action using robust, NR evidence. This could be by laying 
the evidence before peers or, in an extreme situation, taking legal action. In the past this state would be captured 
on paper and openly marked (signed) by those bound by its content. When the parties become virtual and 
timeliness  is  crucial,  some  other  mechanism  is  required.  Maintaining  trust  in  these  circumstances  is  the 
challenge. Today, experimental data is extensive and electronic and, when created, it is not clear what elements 
may be important. The ‘log book’, electronic or paper, is not suitable anymore. There needs to be a robust and 
economical way of enabling NR over this type of data. 
The idea of using cryptographic hashing algorithms to assist time-stamping a digital document was published 
by Haber and Stornetta [3]. The motivation was the ability to easily declare the existence of a document to a 
third party without disclosing its content. Cryptographic hashing algorithms are designed to produce a short 
'digest' (or 'hash') of a digital document (file) which is (a) collision-free i.e. no two documents will generate the 
same digest and (b) it is infeasible to synthesise a collision i.e. generate another document that has the same 
digest as another. Since the digest is, in general, shorter than the original document, there is less information 
there than in the original. Together with the nature of the algorithm, this means nothing can be construed about 
the  original  document  from  its  digest.  The  accepted  cryptographic  hashing  algorithms  are  public  and  are 
continuously subject to scrutiny by cryptanalysts since they underlie electronic signing mechanisms.  
The principles have been used in a number of registration systems, notably the digital notary service operated 
by Surety [6], which is based upon Haber and Stornetta's concept and patents. Also, since 1995 a UK Jersey-
based company has been operating its 'Stamper' time-stamping service based on PGP signing (IT Consulting 
[5]). More recently, in the UK, Codel have been promoting their Codelmark service [4]. 
The Surety and Codel services are both subscription-based services. Subscribers need to have faith in the 
company and trust that their processes are rigorous since the underlying registrations are not open to users' 
scrutiny. Daily, they digest the registration data and publish the resulting 'master hash' in a newspaper of record 
(Codel publish in the Financial Times). ‘Stamper’ attempts to be more open by publishing its signing summaries 
on the web and over Usenet. 
Since the users' digests are not disclosing anything, it is not clear why it should not be possible to openly 
declare the registrations. This reduces the trust barrier to using the system: the users can see their registrations, 
their context and watch the scheme function. Further, if they are concerned about the robustness of the service, 
they can take copies of sufficient data for safe-keeping elsewhere. AHM2009: A networked registration scheme to support open science 
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Though the digests do not declare anything interesting about the user, other data recorded with the digest 
could. Subscription services need to know whose data it is in order to secure their income stream. They can 
undertake  traffic  analysis  on  registrations  and  assign  it  to  users.  Even  if  this  data  is  not  made  public,  the 
registration service needs to be trusted not to ever misuse this data. The only sure way of avoiding this risk is to 
allow anonymous requests for service.  
Thus there is a need for an openly-available registration scheme whose only function is to accept and publish 
sequences of digests received from anonymous users. If the user needs to assert that they, or their company, are 
the only owners of the data at the time, then it is for them to incorporate some secret in the data before its digest 
is registered (e.g. using a signed HMAC, Eastlake and Hansen [2]). That is an optional, separate issue from 
registering the existence of the data. 
 
3. The registration scheme 
 
Open declaration of evidence is optimal. Digest hashes are of fixed length, short and are not expensive to 
store. Publishing these is cheap and web technology provides the ideal ‘notice board’ where the public can 
observe them. 
Anyone with an electronic document that they wish to register posts its hash on a registration server of their 
choice using a protocol that supports anonymity. Because of the properties of cryptographic hashing algorithms, 
the registrand should be able to demonstrate later that only they had the means to create the registration at that 
point in the journal. The registration server’s vital task is to journal the registrations chronologically. The server 
can annotate the registrations with other data. An obvious and useful choice is a timestamp. However, such 
timestamps are only indicative: they are not essential. The scheme fixes the time order of registrations, which is 
necessary and sufficient. 
The  power  and  scaleability  of  the  scheme  lies  in  realising  that  a  registration  server  is  itself  generating 
material that needs evidential protection. Thus, periodically, it hashes a journal segment and registers that with 
another disinterested server. Provided there are sufficient, randomly cross-registering, independently operated 
servers,  the  time  order  of  registrations  across  the  server  network  can  be  adequately  resolved.  Any  timing 
information embedded in the journals is useful, supplementary evidence, particularly if the timestamps (or other 
form of time anchor) come from reputable sources.  
As an example, Figure 1 illustrates what happens when a user registers ‘My Document’ with their chosen 
‘Yellow’ server.  The hash the user generated for My Document is stored with other registrations in Segment 6 
of Yellow’s journal. It returns a receipt to the user that is kept with My Document. Shortly later, Yellow closes 
its Segment 6 and registers its hash with itself in new Segment 7 and the Green server. This process continues at 
indeterminate times among other, disinterested, cross-registering servers. Note that the effect of the registration 
(network  ‘flow’,  in  graph  terms)  is  felt  twice  in  Yellow  Segment  7.  This  achieves  stronger  connectedness 
between the variously-owned segment  nodes  and  distinguishes  this  scheme from those that use hash trees to 
store registrations e.g. [6].  
If the user wishes to assert they were in possession of My Document at the time claimed the registration 
process is replayed but comparing the registration with the evidence in Yellow server Segment 6, as indicated 
by the saved receipt (see Figure 2). For clarity, the illustration shows the user making just one registration with 
one server. For robustness, it is wise to register with at least two servers. 
Once the hash of a server journal segment is released to the network it will rapidly be subsumed within 
further cross-registrations. This locks all the dependent data into time order. No other data on which the hash 








































































































































Figure 1. Registering among net-connected servers
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Figure 2. Confirmation of the state of a documentAHM2009: A networked registration scheme to support open science 
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Many, unknown users—notably, the registrands, will observe the scheme. Further, these will be taking copies 
of relevant segments so that they (or their representative) can replay the algorithms later if required. Server 
operators will not know their users through normal use. Any inexplicable post-hoc alteration or loss of journals 
will cause potentially irreparable damage to their reputation. 
Since there must be formal disinterest between servers and clients, there cannot be any service contract and, 
therefore, the service must be free. This poses some security and resourcing challenges. Fortunately, hashes are 
small, and networks and storage are comparatively cheap. We also have precedents for the evolution of large, 
mutual self-interest based systems—Internet and email. 
The holder of some potential evidence would now have complete freedom to register its hash with servers of 
their choosing. Since services might disappear, it is wise to register with several. Service operators will have a 
service policy that would guide a user in their choice.  
Figure  3  shows  how  a  research  organisation  (e.g.  a 
university)  can  run  a  local  registration  service  to 
concentrate the registration traffic before using a third party 
service. The advantages of doing this are (a) encouraging 
the  IP  developers  to  use  the  service  regularly  and  (b) 
mitigating traffic analysis by outside parties. Because the 
primary server is internal to the organisation, its evidential 
robustness  would  be  more  in  question.  However,  the  IP 
Administration can dynamically adapt its own registration 
policies to suit the risks. 
It is always the users’ responsibility to have the means 
to  replay  the  registration  algorithms  to  a  third  party  to 
prove  that  they  possessed  the  data  at  issue  at  the  time 
claimed. This is why it is important that the scheme is open 
and simple. In a dispute, it is still for the parties to interpret 
the meaning the data that was registered. What will not be 




4. Conclusion and next steps 
 
An open scheme that should enhance the ability of citizens or workers to collaborate with trust is proposed. 
The time is right for its widespread adoption so that it can start to enable the benefits claimed. A very simple 
demonstrator  can  be  accessed  at  Probity
1  [7]  which  readers  are  invited  to  try.  This  uses  HTTP  to  effect 
registrations. 
Work is in progress in developing open-source client and server prototypes to be used within the UK e-
Infrastructure as part of the broader architecture used by both EPrints and the myExperiment project. In its next 
phase, myExperiment is further developing the notion of Research Objects and also exploring the core services 
required for future e-Laboratories.  There is scope for ‘added value’ in embedding the registration primitives 
within tools where NR could be useful. Those with server resources and interest are invited to join the effort and 
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Figure 3. Gathering IP prior-art evidence before publication
Public
realm
Private
realm